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The corporate ﬁnance literature suggests that a ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrm invests less than
an identical unconstrained ﬁrm. This does not imply that ﬁnancial frictions cause ﬁrms to invest
less than in a frictionless economy. When ﬁrms compete for investment funds, an increase in
ﬁnancial frictions can lead individual ﬁrms to increase their investment levels. A greater than
the frictionless level of investment is likely in low productivity ﬁrms, in cash-rich ﬁrms, and in
ﬁrms with cheap external capital. Government programs that make capital cheaper for small
ﬁrms may lead to lower levels of investment for all ﬁrms and decrease eﬃciency.
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A large body of research has stressed the quality of a country’s ﬁnancial markets as an important
determinant of the ﬁrms’ real investments and of economic development and growth.1 But how
exactly is investment aﬀected by ﬁnancial market imperfections? A key result in the corporate
ﬁnance literature says that a ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrm invests less than an identical unconstrained
ﬁrm and that the more ﬁnancially constrained the ﬁrm is the less it invests; see e.g. Rajan and
Zingales (1997), Hubbard (1998), and Stein (2003). It seems natural to conclude from this that
when external ﬁnance is associated with a deadweight cost, ﬁrms invest less than when markets are
frictionless.2
This paper shows that in assessing how ﬁnancing frictions distort investment, one needs to
distinguish whether the external cost is idiosyncratic to a given ﬁrm or whether it aﬀects the
whole economy. In particular, the frequently used case of an otherwise identical unconstrained
ﬁrm is not the appropriate ﬁrst-best benchmark when the external cost aﬀects all ﬁrms in the
economy, as for example when it reﬂects the country’s legal and ﬁnancial institutions, its bankruptcy
procedures, protection of minority shareholders, stock market regulations regarding the disclosure
of information, and so on. Such common factors have market-wide eﬀects, so the appropriate
ﬁrst-best benchmark is the investment level that would be chosen by the ﬁrm in an economy with
perfect capital markets. It is shown here that economy-wide ﬁnancial frictions can easily lead ﬁrms
to invest more than under frictionless markets. Similarly, unlike in the case of idiosyncratic external
costs, a higher common external cost can lead to greater levels of investment by individual ﬁrms.
The argument is as follows. Suppose that new ﬁr m sc a nb ee s t a b l i s h e da sl o n ga st h e yc a nﬁnd
1Boyd and Smith (1992), Bencivenga et al (1995), Aghion and Bolton (1997), Bernhardt and Lloyd-Ellis (2000),
and Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) represent a small sample of this diverse literature. Banerjee and Duﬂo (2005) and
Levine (2005) provide surveys.
2For example, Stein (2003, p. 114) argues that the models of costly external ﬁnance "unambiguously predict
underinvestment relative to a ﬁrst-best benchmark." Similarly, Hubbard (1998, p. 197) concludes that in the presence
of external costs, the equilibrium capital stock "is less than the ﬁrst-best desired capital stock in a frictionless setting."
1enough internal or external funds to ﬁnance their operations. To make things simple, assume also
that all ﬁrms in the economy are identical, so that in equilibrium each ﬁrm earns zero expected
proﬁt. Then if a deadweight cost is introduced into external ﬁnance, the equilibrium interest
rates must fall in order to allow the ﬁrms to break even — otherwise, no ﬁrm would be willing to
raise external ﬁnance. The decrease in the equilibrium rate of return tends to decrease the ﬁrms’
marginal costs of investment, which works against the direct eﬀect of the higher external cost. I
provide simple necessary and suﬃcient conditions under which this indirect, market equilibrium
eﬀect prevails, so that costly external ﬁnance leads each ﬁrm to overinvest, i.e. to invest more than
it would in a frictionless economy. More speciﬁcally, I show the following:
• When all ﬁrms are identical, then each ﬁrm overinvests if at the ﬁrst best level of investment
the marginal external cost is smaller than the average external cost. Each ﬁrm underinvests
if the reverse is true.
• Less productive ﬁrms are more likely to overinvest than more productive ﬁrms. By the same
token, more productive ﬁrms are more likely to underinvest.
• Cash rich ﬁrms and ﬁrms with relatively cheap external capital have a greater tendency to
overinvest, while cash poor ﬁrms and ﬁrms with relatively costly external capital have a
greater tendency to underinvest.
• Firms with free cash always overinvest compared to the ﬁrst best level. Thus, free cash causes
overinvestment in the present model as in Jensen (1986), although for a diﬀerent reason.
• An increase in the cost of external ﬁnance can make some ﬁrms better oﬀ and also improve
eﬃciency.
All of the above results hold whether the economy is closed or open to capital ﬂows. These
results suggest that while the level of capital market frictions is an important determinant of the
2ﬁrms’ investments, so is the composition of the costs associated with these frictions. Moreover,
the results highlight the fact that the aggregate level of investment is not a suﬃcient measure
of investment ineﬃciencies brought about by ﬁnancing imperfections. In particular, the results
show that capital market frictions cause misallocation of resources across ﬁrms — some ﬁrms invest
too much and some invest too little compared to the optimal frictionless level. As shown by
Restuccia and Rogerson (2007), misallocation of resources across ﬁrms can have signiﬁcant eﬀects
on a country’s aggregate output and total factor productivity. In the context of policy distortions
that create heterogeneity in the prices faced by individual producers, their calibrations show that
idiosyncratic investment distortions can lead up to a 50 percent decrease in output and TFP.
In the ﬁnance literature, Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) build a framework similar to the one
employed in this paper and use it to provide an explanation for several cross-country empirical
regularities that tie the eﬀectiveness of a country’s judicial system to corporate ﬁnance.3 While
the main focus of the present paper is on clarifying the theoretical relationship between the costs
of external ﬁnance and the eﬃciency of capital allocation rather than on explaining empirical
regularities, the model also oﬀers some empirical and policy implications that are complementary
to those obtained by Shleifer and Wolfenzon:
• The government programs observed in many countries that make it easier for small ﬁrms to
obtain investment funds may actually lead to lower equilibrium levels of investment for all
ﬁrms and decrease eﬃciency.
• The most productive and cash rich ﬁrms may beneﬁt from the presence of a cost associated
with external ﬁnance. Such ﬁrms might therefore have an incentive to oppose reforms aimed
at improving the ﬁnancial system, consistent with the observation of La Porta et al (2000)
3Another recent market equilibrium model that studies the eﬃciency of capital allocation when ﬁnancial markets
are imperfect is Almeida and Wolfenzon (2005), whose focus is on the reallocation of capital to and from existing
projects and on the eﬀects of conglomeration.
3and other authors.
• The possibility of equilibrium overinvestment due to ﬁnancial markets frictions suggests cau-
tion when interpreting empirical studies that link investment levels and the average ﬁrm size
in a country to the quality of the country’s ﬁnancial and legal systems. For example, if a
study ﬁnds that the countries with better legal protection of investors have larger ﬁrms4,t h i s
does not necessarily mean that those countries also have more eﬃcient ﬁrms.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic model with identical
ﬁrms competing for costly external funds. Section 3 derives the paper’s main results. It shows that
a cost associated with external ﬁnance can lead to overinvestment relative to the frictionless level
and provides a necessary and suﬃcient condition for this outcome. It also contains an analysis of
the model when ﬁrms diﬀer in the quality of their projects, in available cash, and in their costs of
external capital. Finally, the section investigates the robustness of the results to the case where
the economy is open to capital ﬂows from a foreign country. Section 4 discusses some empirical
evidence and policy implications and demonstrates that big ﬁrms can beneﬁtf r o mad e a d w e i g h t
cost in external ﬁnance. Section 5 concludes.
2. The Model
Consider a closed economy with free entry of identical non-atomic ﬁrms. As will be shown later,
the main qualitative results continue to hold when the ﬁrms are heterogeneous and the economy is
open to capital ﬂows from another country.
Ar e p r e s e n t a t i v eﬁrm in this economy has access to a single, one-period investment project. If
this ﬁrm invests an amount I at the beginning of the period, its expected revenue at the end of the
4See, e.g., Kumar, Rajan, and Zingales (2002).
4period is f(I). The investment function f(.):R+ → R+ is given by
f(I)=0 for I ≤ F,a n d
f(I)=V (I) for I ≥ F,
where F>0 is a ﬁxed cost associated with the ﬁrm’s entry into the market and V (I) is an
increasing, concave and diﬀerentiable function, with V (F)=0and limI→∞ V 0(I)=0 .
Each ﬁrm has an initial cash reserve w ≥ 0. For the main part of the analysis it will be assumed
that w ≤ F,s ot h a tn oﬁrm can invest proﬁtably without raising external resources. I will relax
this assumption in Subsection 3.4 and show that the qualitative results continue to hold even if
only some ﬁrms need outside capital.
A ﬁrm can do two things with its funds. First, it can supply investment funds to other ﬁrms,
either directly or through ﬁnancial intermediaries (not modelled here). This yields the rate of
return r, which is endogenous and will be determined as part of the equilibrium. Alternatively, the
ﬁrm can invest in its own project. If a ﬁrm decides to invest an amount I>win its own project,
it has to seek external ﬁnancing for the diﬀerence e = I − w.
External resources are costly. The literature has identiﬁed several sources of friction that put
a wedge between the cost of a ﬁrm’s external and internal investment funds. External funds can
be costly due to asymmetric information and adverse selection, as in Myers and Majluf (1984) and
Greenwald, Stiglitz and Weiss (1984), debt overhang, as in Myers (1977), or incomplete contracting
and costly state veriﬁcation, as in Townsend (1979) and Gale and Hellwig (1985).5 In modeling this
cost, I will follow Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993), Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Matsusaka and
Nanda (2002), and others, and assume that if a ﬁrm invests I>w , then in addition to foregoing the
5For surveys of this literature see, e.g., Harris and Raviv (1991) and Stein (2003).
5market rate of return r on the whole amount I, it has to bear a deadweight cost c(θ,e) associated
with raising the amount e. The parameter θ is a measure of frictions in the external capital markets
— the higher is θ, the higher is the deadweight cost of raising a given amount e.6
The cost function c(θ,e) is diﬀerentiable in both arguments; its derivative with respect to
x ∈ {θ,e} will be denoted as cx(θ,e). In addition to cθ(θ,e) > 0 assumed above, c(θ,e) is non-
decreasing and convex in e: ce(θ,e) ≥ 0 and cee(θ,e) ≥ 0.
At the beginning of the period, all ﬁrms simultaneously approach outside investors with their
investment proposals, in an attempt to raise external funds, e. The total amount of investment
funds available in this economy (including the ﬁrms’ cash reserves, w) is given by the supply function
S(r), which is weakly increasing in the interest rate, r. In this setting, the equilibrium interest rate
is determined by supply of and demand for investment funds. In particular, each investor oﬀers
ﬁnancing to those ﬁrms that promise the highest rate of return. At the same time, the projects
that ﬁrms propose to undertake must be credible, that is, if a ﬁrm proposes to invest an amount I,
it cannot promise to repay more than f(I) at the end of the period. Finally, due to the free entry
of ﬁrms, the equilibrium interest rate must be such that each ﬁrm earns zero economic proﬁt.
3. The Analysis
3.1. The equilibrium level of investment
Each ﬁrm chooses its investment level I and the amount of external ﬁnancing e,s oa st om a x i m i z e
its proﬁt π(I,e,θ,w)=f(I)/(1 + r) − I − c(θ,e), subject to the ﬁnancing constraint I ≤ w + e.
Because external capital is costly, no ﬁrm will raise more than the minimum amount needed to
ﬁnance the chosen level of investment, so that e = I − w.M o r e o v e r , i f a ﬁrm invests a positive
6As pointed out by Stein (2003), this reduced-form speciﬁcation of capital market frictions is more general than
it may seem. Stein (1998) shows that it corresponds to a version of the Myers and Majluf’s (1984) adverse-selection
model and Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) map it into a variant of the costly-state-veriﬁcation models of Townsend
(1979) and Gale and Hellwig (1985).
6amount, then it must be that I>F ,s ot h a tf(I)=V (I); otherwise the proﬁt would be negative.
Substituting to the objective function, the representative ﬁrm’s maximization problem becomes
max
e V (w + e)/(1 + r) − w − e − c(θ,e).
The associated ﬁrst order condition then says that if the ﬁrm invests, it chooses the e∗(w,θ) given
by
V 0(w + e∗(w,θ))
1+ce(θ,e∗(w,θ))
=1+r. (1)
It will be assumed from now on that π(e∗(w,θ),θ,w) > 0, so that the ﬁrms operate at a positive
scale.7 Then e∗(w,θ) is the equilibrium level of external ﬁnancing, which uniquely deﬁnes the
equilibrium level of investment: I∗(w,θ)=w + e∗(w,θ).
Free entry of ﬁrms drives their expected proﬁts to zero. This implies that the equilibrium rate
of return, r∗(w,θ), must be such that V (w+e∗(w,θ))/(1+r∗(w,θ))−I∗(w,θ)−c(θ,e∗(w,θ)) = 0,
that is,
V (w + e∗(w,θ))
w + e∗(w,θ)+c(θ,e∗(w,θ))
=1+r∗(w,θ). (2)
Combining the ﬁrst order condition (1) with the zero proﬁtc o n s t r a i n t( 2 )y i e l d st h ef o l l o w i n g
condition, which deﬁnes the equilibrium level of investment:
V 0(I∗(w,θ))I∗(w,θ) − V (I∗(w,θ)) = V (I∗(w,θ))ce(θ,e∗(w,θ)) − V 0(I∗(w,θ))c(θ,e∗(w,θ)). (3)
It will be shown in the proof of Proposition 1 that a solution to (3) exists. Moreover, because
the left hand side of (3) decreases and the right hand side increases in e∗(w,θ) and I∗(w,θ),t h e
7Note that due to the presence of ﬁxed costs and of deadweight costs of external ﬁnance, the usual condition
V
0(F)=∞ is not suﬃcient to guarantee that π(e
∗(w,θ),θ,w) > 0.I n s t e a d ,V (.) n e e d st ob e" s u ﬃciently large" and
F and c need to be "suﬃciently small."
7solution is unique. Note also that the equilibrium investment level for each individual ﬁrm, I∗(w,θ),
is independent of the overall supply of investment funds in the economy, S(r).
In a frictionless world, the optimal level of investment, If,w o u l db eg i v e nb y
V 0(If)If − V (If)=0 . (4)
I will refer to the benchmark investment level If as the ﬁrst best level. As can be seen by comparing
conditions (3) and (4), costly external ﬁnance in general causes ﬁrms to distort their investment
levels away from the ﬁr s tb e s tl e v e l . Iw i l ls a yt h a taﬁrm "overinvests" when I∗(w,θ) >I f and
"underinvests" when I∗(w,θ) <I f.
3.2. Investment distortion
Focusing on an individual ﬁrm in isolation, the previous work has established that if the ﬁrm’s
external capital is costly, the ﬁrm will underinvest, that is, I∗ <I f (from now on, the notation will
suppress the dependence of I∗, e∗,a n dr∗ on w and θ). Moreover, when the external cost rises, the
ﬁrm decreases its investment level, that is, ∂I∗/∂θ ≤ 0; see e.g. Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and
Stein (2003).
These conclusions extend to the present framework if the variable of concern is the aggregate
level of investment, i.e. the sum of the investments undertaken by all ﬁrms in the economy:8
Proposition 1. Let I∗
A denote the equilibrium aggregate level of investment in the economy, i.e.
I∗
A = n∗I∗,w h e r en∗ is the equilibrium number of ﬁrms, and let I
f
A be the ﬁrst-best aggregate







∂θ < 0 if S(r) is strictly increasing; and







∂θ =0if S(r) is perfectly inelastic.
Thus, if outside capital is costly, the aggregate level of investment is (weakly) smaller than would
be eﬃcient. However, the corporate ﬁnance literature has typically focused on the relationship be-
tween external costs and the investment levels of individual ﬁrms. For individual investment levels,
the standard partial equilibrium conclusions do not extrapolate into a market equilibrium setting.
Looking ﬁrst at the underinvestment result, this is demonstrated in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. If external capital is costly, then each ﬁrm overinvests compared to the ﬁrst best




and underinvests (I∗ <I f) if the reverse is true.
Thus, costly external ﬁnance can result in overinvestment relative to the frictionless level. As
shown by Corollary 1 below, one can easily ﬁnd examples of cost functions such that condition (5)
is satisﬁed.
Corollary 1. Suppose ﬁrms have no internal funds (w =0 )a n dt h ed e a d w e i g h tc o s to fe x t e r n a l
capital is given by c(θ,ef)=α(θ)+β(θ)e,w h e r eα(θ) > 0 and β(θ) ≥ 0 are increasing
functions of θ.T h e ne x t e r n a lc o s to fﬁnance always causes overinvestment: I∗ >I f.
The logic behind the above two propositions and the corollary is as follows. First, ﬁnancial
frictions in the present framework lead to a decrease in the equilibrium interest rate, because the
introduction of the deadweight cost c(θ,e) would cause the ﬁrms to lose money if the interest rate
remained at the frictionless level rf. Therefore, the interest rate must fall to induce the ﬁrms to seek
external ﬁnancing. This is counter to the intuition one might have based on the models of ﬁnancial
contracting in which asymmetric information and agency problems lead investors to increase the
9price of the investment funds, thus in eﬀe c tp a s s i n go nt ot h eﬁrm the expected cost that arises
due to the contracting imperfections. Note, however, that because they also bear the external cost
c,t h e" e ﬀective" interest rate faced by the ﬁrms may or may not be lower than the frictionless
rate. Second, the fall in interest rates causes the aggregate amount of supplied funds to decrease
if S(r) is upward sloping, which in equilibrium translates into a decrease in the aggregate level of
investment. Finally, to see why the ﬁrms’ individual investments can increase, note that if the ﬁxed
deadweight cost of external ﬁnancing is relatively large compared to the marginal deadweight cost,
as in the example of Corollary 1, then the resulting break-even interest rate r∗ is very low. But this
means that the marginal cost of investment is also low (lower than in a frictionless world), which
induces each ﬁrm to overinvest.9,10
Perhaps it is worth reiterating that under- and over-investment are measured compared to the
ﬁrst best level, which is the level of investment that the ﬁrms would choose if capital markets
were perfect. However, holding the rate of return ﬁxed, if there were two groups of ﬁrms in this
economy, one with a higher marginal cost of external capital than the other, then the group with
the higher cost would invest less ("underinvest") compared to the group with the lower cost. This
is the standard partial equilibrium result, which has been the focus of the previous literature. The
importance of Proposition 2 is in demonstrating that this partial equilibrium observation cannot be
invoked to conclude that when capital markets are imperfect, individual ﬁrms underinvest relative
to the frictionless level.
The second insight from Propositions 1 and 2 is that the aggregate distortions due to costly
9More precisely, the ﬁrms that in equilibrium choose positive levels of investment overinvest. This can hold
together with aggregate underinvestment only if some ﬁrms completely shut down their operations, which in a sense
means that they underinvest.
10In addition to the eﬀects described in the text, there could be secondary eﬀects on investment through the
(unmodelled) factor markets. For example, suppose that production requires labor. By decreasing the equilibrium
aggregate level of investment, I
∗
A, an external cost of ﬁnancing should also cause a fall in the aggregate demand for
labor and depress real wages. This in turn should further boost each individual ﬁrm’s investment level, magnifying
the eﬀects analyzed in this paper.
10external ﬁnance diﬀer in their nature from the distortions at individual ﬁrms. For example, it is
possible that each individual ﬁrm deviates from the ﬁrst-best level of investment, but the aggregate
investment remains at the ﬁrst-best, frictionless level. The reverse situation is also possible. Thus,
to get a complete picture of how capital market imperfections aﬀect the allocation of investment
funds in the economy, one has to consider both the aggregate and the individual level distortions.
This conclusion is in line with the point made by Restuccia and Rogerson (2007), who also stress the
importance of distortions at the level of individual producers. Restuccia and Rogerson’s calibrations
indicate that policies that lead ﬁrms to idiosyncratic investment distortions can cause up to a 50
percent decrease in output and TFP.
3.3. The eﬀects of an increase in the cost of external ﬁnance
Treating the rate of return as exogenous, Kaplan and Zingales (1997) show that a ﬁrm’s investment
level always weakly decreases in the cost of external ﬁnance. In the present model, an increase in
t h ed e a d w e i g h tc o s to fe x t e r n a lﬁnance can lead to an increase in the equilibrium level of investment
for each ﬁrm. This is illustrated in Proposition 3 below for a class of linear cost functions.
Proposition 3. Let c(θ,e)=θ(A + e),w h e r eA ≥ 0 is a constant. Then
∂I∗(θ)
∂θ > 0 if A>w ,
∂I∗(θ)
∂θ < 0 if A<w ,a n d
∂I∗(θ)
∂θ =0if A = w.
Thus, when the deadweight cost of external funds is linear with a relatively large ﬁxed cost, each
ﬁrm’s equilibrium level of investment increases i nt h ed e g r e eo fﬁnancing friction. For example, if
ﬁrms have no internal resources (w =0 ), then the equilibrium level of investment increases in the
cost of external capital whenever external capital is associated with some positive ﬁxed cost. On
the other hand, when w =0and external funding entails no ﬁxed cost (A =0 ), then the individual
investments are always at the ﬁrst best level, I∗ = If, no matter how costly are the external
funds. In this case the deadweight cost of external ﬁnance is completely oﬀset by a decrease in the
11equilibrium rate of return. The cost of external ﬁnance is then reﬂected solely in the equilibrium
number of ﬁrms and in the equilibrium aggregate level of investment.
T h el i t e r a t u r eo nﬁnancial frictions and development has for the most part focused on how the
allocation of resources and a country’s economic development depend on the degree of ﬁnancial
market imperfections. Propositions 2 and 3 suggest that it is equally important to consider the
composition of the deadweight costs. The larger is the ﬁxed cost of external ﬁnance, and the
smaller is the marginal cost, the larger should be the average size of the ﬁrms operating in the
given economy.11 The ﬁxed costs associated with external ﬁnancing can include, for example, a
part of the decline in the stock price upon the announcement of a stock issue, government taxes and
fees, ﬁxed fees paid to the underwriter, and so on. These factors direct the ﬂow of resources towards
a relatively small number of large ﬁrms. The marginal costs include any cost that depends upon the
amount of the capital raised in the external markets. For example, agency costs should be higher
the higher is the percentage of a ﬁrm’s stock held by outside investors, underwriters’ marketing
costs may be increasing in the size of the equity issue, expected bankruptcy costs increase with the
amount of debt, and so on. In the present model, these factors tend to direct resources towards a
relatively large number of smaller ﬁrms.
3.4. The eﬃciency of investment when ﬁrms are heterogenous
This subsection extends the above analysis to a setting with heterogenous ﬁrms; it also allows for
the possibility that some ﬁrms are able to ﬁnance all their investments internally. In particular,
assume that the economy has a measure 1 of potential ﬁrms parameterized by t, which is distributed
on [0,1] according to a cumulative distribution function G(t). The parameter t will be given three
11Obviously, the model ignores dynamic considerations, which could play an important role. For example, if ﬁrms
could time their investments, large ﬁxed costs of external ﬁnance could lead them to invest larger amounts, but less
frequently.
12alternative interpretations. Accordingly, let t ∈ {θ,φ,η}.W h e nt = θ,t h eﬁrms diﬀer in the costs
they face when raising external funds, where, in contrast to the previous analysis, each ﬁrm can
have a diﬀerent θ. As before, cθ(θ,e) > 0; in addition, ceθ(θ,e) > 0.W h e nt = φ,t h eﬁrms diﬀer
in projects they have access to: f(I)=V (I,φ) for I ≥ F,w h e r eVφ(I,φ) > 0 and VIφ(I,φ) > 0.
That is, the higher is a ﬁrm’s φ, the greater is the total and marginal productivity of its project —
say, due to a greater degree of monopoly power the ﬁrm has in its product market. Finally, when
t = η,t h eﬁrms diﬀer in the levels of their internal funds, w(η),w i t hah i g h e rη indicating a smaller
amount of cash reserves, i.e., w0(η) < 0. To streamline the exposition and to better isolate the
eﬀects of each parameter, I will assume that the ﬁr m sa l w a y sd i ﬀer along a single dimension, while
the other two dimensions are uniform. Also, because a ﬁrm’s proﬁtw h e ni ti n v e s t so p t i m a l l ya ta
given rate of return depends monotonically on t, I will sometimes refer to t as the ﬁrm’s proﬁtability
parameter.
In either of these three settings, the equilibrium levels of investment are again determined by
an equation analogous to (3), except now this equation is derived from the zero proﬁt condition for
the marginal ﬁrm. The marginal ﬁrm is the ﬁrm whose proﬁtability parameter is ˆ t such that the
capital markets clear, that is,
Z 1
ˆ t




{V (I,φ)/(1 + r∗) − I − c(θ,I − w(η))}
is the optimal level of investment by a ﬁrm with proﬁtability parameter t.L e te(t)=m a x {0,I−
w(η)} denote ﬁrm t’ sl e v e lo fo u t s i d eﬁnancing. The eﬃciency of investment in the above three
frameworks is characterized by the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Suppose that ﬁrms diﬀer in their proﬁtability, as measured by parameter t.
13(i) The marginal ﬁrm, ˆ t, overinvests compared to the frictionless level (I∗(ˆ t) >I f(ˆ t)) if




and underinvests (I∗(ˆ t) <I f(t)) if the reverse is true.
(ii) There exists a t∗ ∈ [0,1] such that I∗(t) >I f(t) if t<t ∗ and I∗(t) <I f(t) if t>t ∗.
As before, the deadweight cost of external capital tends to increase the ﬁrms’ marginal costs of
investment. At the same time, it decreases the equilibrium interest rates, which tends to decrease
the marginal cost of investment. Part (i) in Proposition 4 says that these two eﬀects lead to the
same qualitative results when ﬁr m sa r eh e t e r o g e n e o u sa st h e yd i dw h e nﬁrms were identical. Part
(ii) then demonstrates that the eﬀects of costly external ﬁnance on a given ﬁrm depend on the ﬁrm’s
characteristics in a systematic way. Overinvestment compared to the frictionless level is more likely
to be observed in low productivity ﬁrms, in ﬁrms with large cash reserves, and in ﬁrms with low
costs of external ﬁnance.12 This is detailed in the following corollaries.
Corollary 2. Suppose ﬁrms diﬀer in the productivity of their projects (t = φ). Then either all
ﬁrms overinvest, all ﬁrms underinvest, or there is a productivity level φ∗ such that all the less
productive ﬁrms overinvest and all the more productive ﬁrms underinvest.
This result follows because more productive ﬁrms optimally invest more than less productive
ﬁrms and therefore, all else equal, need more outside ﬁnancing. Since the cost function c(.,e) is
convex, these ﬁrms face a higher marginal cost of investment (at optimum) than low productivity
12Depending on the exact functional forms for c and G, it could be that ˆ t>t
∗,s ot h a tI
∗(t) <I
f(t) always. In
this case, all but the most proﬁtable ﬁrms underinvest, and overinvestment is not a concern.
In general, it is hard to pin down the conditions for ˆ t<t
∗. Note, however, that Corollary 1 implies (by continuity)
that ˆ t<t
∗ at least for some distribution functions G and cost functions c.
14ﬁrms. Accordingly, more productive ﬁrms are more prone to underinvestment, while less productive
ﬁrms are more prone to overinvestment (due to low interest rates).
Corollary 3. Suppose ﬁrms diﬀer in their costs of external ﬁnance (t = θ). Then
(a) either all ﬁrms overinvest, all ﬁrms underinvest, or there is a costs of external ﬁnance c(θ∗,.)
such that all ﬁrms with less costly external funds overinvest and all ﬁrms with more costly
external funds underinvest;
(b) the ﬁr m sw i t hc o s t l e s se x t e r n a lf u n d s(c(θ,e)=0for all e)a l w a y so v e r i n v e s tc o m p a r e dt ot h e
ﬁrst best level.
Corollary 3 conﬁrms the standard partial equilibrium result that, all else equal, a ﬁrm’s optimal
level of investment decreases in its cost of external funds, but in addition it shows that, due to the
market equilibrium eﬀects on the rate of return, the ﬁrms with the lowest costs of external ﬁnance
may in fact invest more than in a frictionless world.
Corollary 4. Suppose ﬁrms diﬀer in their cash reserves (t = η). Then
(a) either all ﬁrms overinvest, all ﬁrms underinvest, or there is a level of cash reserves w(η∗)
such that all ﬁrms with cash reserves greater than w(η∗) overinvest and all ﬁrms with cash
reserves less than w(η∗) underinvest;
(b) the ﬁrms with free cash (w(η) ≥ If) always overinvest compared to the ﬁr s tb e s tl e v e l .
All else equal, cash poor ﬁrms need more outside funds than cash rich ﬁrms, which means
that, due to the convexity of c(.,e),c a s hp o o rﬁrms face a higher marginal cost of investment
than cash rich ﬁrms. Cash poor ﬁrms are therefore more likely to underinvest, while cash rich
ﬁrms are more likely to overinvest. Thus, as in Jensen (1986), free cash induces overinvestment
15in the present model, albeit for a diﬀerent reason. In Jensen’s model, the ineﬃciencies are due
to agency problems in declining industries, whereas here the ineﬃcient overinvestment is due to
low equilibrium interest rates: Capital market frictions depress the equilibrium interest rate below
what it would be if outside ﬁnancing were costless, because otherwise the cash poor ﬁrms would
not be able to survive. Since the cash rich ﬁrms do not need to worry about the costs of external
ﬁnance, this low interest rate leads them to overinvest. Corollary 4 also demonstrates that the
paper’s main insights continue to hold even if only a small fraction of ﬁrms need outside capital.
3.5. Open economies
So far, the analysis was conducted under the assumption that the economy is closed to capital
ﬂows. It is relatively straightforward to extend the results to a setting where capital can ﬂow freely
between countries. Suppose there are two economies, 1 and 2. Economy 1 has perfect capital
markets, so that external capital is costless, while in economy 2 external capital is associated with
a deadweight cost, c(.,e). The supply of external capital provided by the investors in economy j is
Sj(r), where for simplicity S1(r)=S2(r)=S(r). As in the previous subsection, ﬁrms diﬀer in a
parameter t, which here measures either their productivities (t = φ) or their cash reserves (t = η).13
To avoid the issue of intra-ﬁrm transfers of funds across economies, I will assume that each
ﬁrm can be established only in one or the other economy, but not in both. Moreover, to be able
to raise funds in a given economy, a ﬁrm has to be established in that economy. It follows that
it is not possible for ﬁrms established in economy i to directly raise capital in economy j, i 6= j.
However, if the economies are open, the capital can move freely between the two economies, so a
ﬁrm established in economy i can be indirectly ﬁnanced by capital from economy j,i ft h i sc a p i t a l
ﬂows to economy i. This setup ensures that it is not possible for the ﬁrms in economy 2 to avoid
13If the ﬁrms only diﬀered in their external costs and the economies opened up to capital ﬂows, all the funds from
economy 2 would ﬂow to economy 1 and no ﬁrm would get ﬁnanced in economy 2.
16the deadweight cost associated with raising funds in this economy.
Suppose ﬁrst the economies are closed to capital ﬂows. As before, the equilibrium rate of return
in each economy must be such that the marginal ﬁrm earns zero economic proﬁt, while the capital
markets clear. That is, in economy j, j =1 ,2,t h em a r g i n a lﬁrm is the ﬁrm whose productivity












{V (I,φ)/(1 + r∗
j) − I − λc(θ,I − w(η))}
is the optimal level of investment by a ﬁrm whose proﬁtability parameter is t and was established
in economy j,w i t hλ =0if j =1and λ =1if j =2 . This investment level is given by the ﬁrst
order condition
VI(I∗
j,φ) − (1 + r∗
j)[1 + λcI(θ,I∗
j − w(η))] = 0.( 9 )
To simplify notation, denote the optimal investment level of the marginal ﬁrm as ˆ I∗








j) − ˆ I∗
j − λc(θ, ˆ I∗
j − w(η∗
j)) = 0.( 1 0 )
Conditions (8) — (10) jointly determine the equilibrium in economy j.
The ﬁrst question of interest is which economy oﬀers the higher rate of return. To answer this
question, note that holding the rate of return r∗
j constant, (9) implies that I∗
j(t) decreases in λ for
any given t, while (10) and the Envelope Theorem imply that ˆ tj increases in λ. Hence, I∗
2(t) <I ∗
1(t)
for all t and ˆ t2 > ˆ t1, which means that the left hand side of (8) is smaller in economy 2 than in
17economy 1 if the rate of return is held constant. In a similar way, it is possible to check that I∗
j(t)
decreases and ˆ tj increases in r∗
j, so that the left hand side of (8) decreases in r∗
j. The comparative
statics results of Milgrom and Roberts (1994) then immediately imply that r∗
2 <r ∗
1.M o r e o v e r ,
since capital markets are frictionless in economy 1, the ﬁrms in this economy invest at the ﬁrst best
level, so that r∗
2 <r ∗
1 = rf.
If the economies open themselves to capital ﬂows, capital will ﬂow from economy 2, in which
external ﬁnancing is costly, to economy 1, where capital markets are frictionless and therefore
(initially) oﬀer higher rates of return. This capital reallocation increases the supply of investment
funds in economy 1 and decreases in economy 2, causing a decline in the rate of return in economy
1 and an increase in the rate of return in economy 2, until r∗∗
1 = r∗∗
2 = r∗∗ <r f,w h e r er∗∗
j denotes
the equilibrium rate of return in economy j when the two economies are open. This analysis yields
the following results.
Proposition 5. Suppose that ﬁrms diﬀer in their proﬁtability, as measured by parameter t, and
that there are two economies open to capital ﬂows: economy 1 with no cost of external capital
and economy 2 where external ﬁnancing is costly. Then:
(a) All ﬁrms established in economy 1 overinvest compared to the ﬁrst best level.
(b) The marginal ﬁrm, ˆ t2,e s t a b l i s h e di ne c o n o m y2o v e r i n v e s t sc o m p a r e dt ot h eﬁr s tb e s tl e v e li f
1+rf
1+r∗∗ > 1+ce(θ,ef(ˆ t2)), (11)
and underinvests if the reverse is true.
(c) Part (ii) of Proposition 4 continues to hold in this setting.
Proposition 5 shows that allowing for perfect capital mobility between economies does not aﬀect
18this paper’s main results in any important way. The ﬁrms in economy 2, of course, invest less than
the ﬁrms in economy 1, because the equilibrium interest rates are the same in the two economies and
the ﬁrms in economy 2 also face the additional marginal cost of external ﬁnance, ce(θ,e).H o w e v e r ,
due to the inﬂow of capital from economy 2, the ﬁrms established in economy 1 overinvest compared
to the ﬁrst best level because the capital inﬂow decreases the interest rates in economy 1 below
the eﬃcient level (i.e., r∗∗ <r ∗
1 = rf) .T h i sc o n c l u s i o nh o l d sa sl o n ga se c o n o m y2i sn o ts os m a l l
compared to economy 1 that it does not have any eﬀect on the world interest rates.
On the other hand, the outﬂow of capital from economy 2 causes the interest rates to rise in this
economy, which curbs the investment levels of the ﬁrms established in economy 2. Nevertheless,
these ﬁrms can still overinvest if (a) the rise in the interest rate in economy 2 is not too large (which
depends upon the distribution, G(t),o ft h eﬁrms’ proﬁtability parameters), and (b) condition (5’)
is satisﬁed for the marginal ﬁrm in a closed economy 2. These two requirements combine to yield
condition (11) in the proposition.
4. Empirical implications and policy considerations
While the primary goal of this paper is to clarify the theoretical relation between external cost of
ﬁnancing and investment eﬃciency, this section brieﬂy discusses some available empirical evidence
and some implications of the above analysis for evaluating government policies that aﬀect the costs
of raising outside capital.
4.1. Empirical implications
One could perhaps imagine dynamic settings in which investment and ﬁrm size are only loosely
related, but in the static framework explored here, ﬁrms that invest more are inevitably larger.
Taking this relationship at face value, the model’s predictions appear to be consistent with the
19available empirical evidence. In particular, Proposition 4 implies that cash rich ﬁrms and the ﬁrms
with less costly external funds should be bigger. This is consistent with the evidence that larger
ﬁrms tend to have easier access to outside capital and more internal funds than smaller ﬁrms. For
example, Mayer (1988) shows that large ﬁrms tend to ﬁnance their projects from internal funds
or through captive or closely related banks. La Porta et al. (1997) show that in the countries
with poor creditor protection, a disproportionate share of credit goes to the few largest ﬁrms. And
according to Altinkilic and Hansen (2000), large ﬁrms face lower underwriting spreads than small
ﬁrms for both equity and bond issues. Thus, there appears to be a positive correlation between a
ﬁrm’s cash reserves and its size, as well as between a ﬁrm’s cost of external capital and its size.14
The model also suggests caution in interpreting evidence about the relationship between the
distribution of ﬁrm sizes in a given country and the country’s costs of external funds. For example,
Kumar, Rajan, and Zingales (2002) document that countries with better legal protection of outside
investors tend to have bigger ﬁrms. The above analysis says that one cannot take this as evidence
that the countries with less costly external funds have more eﬃcient ﬁrms, because bigger does not
imply more eﬃcient in a market equilibrium framework. It could well be that the ﬁrms in the low
cost countries invest too much compared to the ﬁr s tb e s tl e v e l .P r o p o s i t i o n2s a y st h a tt h i sw o u l d
be in particular true if the ﬁxed costs of raising outside capital in these countries were relatively
high compared to the marginal costs, and Proposition 5 shows that when capital can ﬂow freely
between countries, all ﬁrms in a country with frictionless capital markets are too big compared to
the ﬁrst best benchmark (unless, of course, all countries have frictionless capital markets).
14It is possible, of course, that the causality runs in the opposite direction, i.e., that big ﬁrms have easier access to
funds because they are big, rather than productivity advantages and cheap funds leading some ﬁrms to grow large.
One way to capture the former relationship in the present model would be to make the external cost function concave
rather than convex. As long as the ﬁrms’ objective functions remain concave, the main qualitative eﬀect of such a
concave external cost should be to increase the equilibrium dispersion of the ﬁrms’ sizes.
204.2. The eﬀects of external costs on proﬁts
One might be tempted to conjecture that a deadweight cost of external ﬁnance cannot make ﬁrms
better oﬀ. This conjecture is false, as can be easily shown when ﬁrms diﬀer in their level of internal
cash reserves or in their productivities. To focus on the argument, suppose that there are only two
types of ﬁrms: measure h of ﬁrms have internal funds equal to wH (type H ﬁrms), while the rest
of the ﬁrms are of type L, with internal funds equal to wL <w H. There is free entry of the L-type
ﬁrms, which means that the L-type ﬁrms earn zero proﬁt, while the H-type ﬁrms earn positive
proﬁts, because it is easier for them to avoid the high cost of external capital.
Now consider an increase in the cost of external ﬁnance, which drives the equilibrium rates of
return down, as in the previous analysis. These changes do not aﬀect the equilibrium proﬁts of the
L-type ﬁrms (who again just break even), but they can beneﬁtt h eH-type ﬁrms. In fact, if these
ﬁrms have enough internal funds to ﬁnance all their investments, their proﬁts always increase with
the external costs, as can be seen by inspecting their proﬁt function πH = V (I∗
H) − (1 + r∗)I∗
H.15
An important implication of this observation is that the H-type ﬁrms would have an incentive to
oppose any corporate governance reform that would decrease the cost of external ﬁnancing. This
comports well with the observations of La Porta et al (2000) and other authors, who argue that in
many countries large corporations (presumably the most productive and/or cash rich ﬁrms) tend
to oppose reforms of the ﬁnancial and legal systems that would facilitate external ﬁnancing. This
result also complements the ﬁnding of Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002), who show that in their model
a stronger protection of outside investors would be opposed by the marginal (zero-proﬁt) ﬁrms.
15The Envelope Theorem says that the eﬀects of a change in θ on I
∗
H can be ignored here.
214.3. Government help to small ﬁrms and eﬃciency
Many governments sponsor programs that help small businesses to obtain investment funds. For
example, Lerner (1999) reports that the U.S. Small Business Innovation Research program allocated
over $7 billion to small ﬁrms between 1983 and 1997. The above analysis does not necessarily mean
that such policies are ineﬃcient, but it suggests that it is not hard to ﬁnd situations where this is the
case. To see that a program that helps small businesses with ﬁnancing could be counterproductive,
assume again L-type ﬁrms and a measure h of H-type ﬁrms, as in the previous subsection, and
suppose that the program allows the L ﬁrms to increase the level of their costless funds, wL.16
A comprehensive evaluation of a policy should include its eﬀects on consumer surplus, which is
outside the scope of this model. However, the following result is suggestive in that it shows that
a program of help to small ﬁrms could negatively aﬀect the combined surplus of the economy’s
investors and entrepreneurs.
Proposition 6. Suppose S(r∗) is inelastic and the H-type ﬁrms ﬁnd it proﬁtable to seek outside










Then there exist cutoﬀ values h1 ≥ 0 and h2 >h 1 such that if h ∈ [h1,h 2] the overall surplus
of investors and entrepreneurs decreases in wL.
Condition (12) is satisﬁed in many reasonable settings. For example, it holds when V (I)=
√
kI − F (for I ≥ F)a n dc(θ)=α + θe,w h e r ek and α are constants.
The intuition behind Proposition 6 is that, all else equal, an increase in the level of wL makes the
L ﬁrms more proﬁtable, which forces them to bid up the equilibrium interest rate so that their zero
16I ft h eg o v e r n m e n tn e e d st or a i s et a x e st oﬁnance this program, the conclusion of Proposition 6 would be further
reinforced, even if the taxes were non-distortionary, because the tax would decrease the total supply of investment
funds, thus decreasing the equilibrium number of ﬁrms in the economy.
22proﬁt condition is restored. The higher rate of interest increases the marginal cost of investment,
leading to a lower equilibrium level of investment for both types of ﬁrms, and possibly making the
H-type ﬁrms less proﬁtable. If the number of the H-type ﬁrms in the economy is relatively high,
a decline in their proﬁts causes a decrease in overall welfare.
5. Conclusion
Firms often need to rely on outside investors to ﬁnance their projects. Given that capital markets
are imperfect and involve frictions, external resources come typically at a cost. An important
question is then how this cost aﬀects the allocation of resources in the economy. Focusing on
an individual ﬁrm in isolation, the standard result in the corporate ﬁnance literature says that a
deadweight cost of external capital will lead ﬁrms to underinvest compared to the ﬁrst-best level
and the underinvestment will worsen when the external cost increases. This also seems to imply
that when external ﬁnancing entails a deadweight cost ﬁrms must be worse oﬀ.
This paper shows that these conclusions do not hold in a market equilibrium setting and cau-
tions against extrapolating the partial equilibrium results when assessing the eﬀects of government
policies and corporate governance reforms on economic eﬃciency. It also highlights that to fully
understand how ﬁnancial frictions distort the allocation of resources in an economy, one needs to
examine the eﬀects of external costs on both the aggregate level of investment as well as on the
investments of individual ﬁrms, as these two eﬀects are in general orthogonal to each other.
While the paper demonstrates that ﬁnancial markets imperfections aﬀect the allocation of re-
sources across ﬁrms in a more complex way than suggested by the existing literature and clariﬁes
some relationships that were previously not recognized, it does not yield a clear-cut policy rec-
ommendation on how to best proceed with reforms of the ﬁnancial and legal systems. Such a
recommendation, however, might be feasible after further research, both theoretical and empirical,
23into the exact nature and composition of the deadweight costs associated with external ﬁnance.
A. Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 .Note ﬁrst that the solution to (3) exists and is unique. The uniqueness
was proved in the text. To show existence, evaluate ﬁrst the left hand side (LHS) and the right
hand side (RHS) of (3) at I∗ = F.U s i n gV (F)=0 ,w eg e t
LHS(3) = V 0(F)F>−V 0(F)c(θ,F − w)=RHS(3).
Next, let e∗,I∗ →∞ .T h e nRHS(3) = limI∗→∞ V (I∗)ce(θ,e∗)=∞, while the concavity of V (.)
yields LHS(3) = limI∗→∞[V 0(I∗)I∗ − V (I∗)] < 0.H e n c e , LHS(3) <R H S (3) in this case. The
existence of a solution to (3) then follows because LHS(3) decreases and RHS(3) increases in e∗
and I∗.
Now, in equilibrium, supply of funds must be equal to demand for funds: I∗
A = S(r∗) and
I
f
A = S(rf).T h u s ,I∗
A = I
f




A if r∗ <r f,a n d∂I∗
A/∂θ < 0 if ∂r∗/∂θ < 0.
Iw i l lﬁrst show that r∗ must be decreasing in θ. Consider an initial equilibrium with θ = θ1 and
suppose θ increases to θ2 >θ 1.B e c a u s ec increases in θ,e a c hﬁrm’s cost of ﬁnancing is higher at θ2
than it was at θ1, and this is true for any investment level. This means that if the interest rate stays
the same, each ﬁrm makes a negative proﬁtw h e nθ = θ2, because in the initial equilibrium with
θ = θ1 all ﬁrms were making zero expected proﬁts, due to free entry. Since in the new equilibrium




To see that r∗ <r f, it is enough to apply the above argument to the case where the initial
24equilibrium is the ﬁrst best equilibrium (i.e., there are no external costs). Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 . Evaluate both sides of (3) at I = If. The concavity of the ﬁrm’s
objective function implies that If <I ∗ if and only if the left hand side of (3) is greater than the
right hand side. From (4), the left hand side of (3) evaluated at If is zero. Hence, If <I ∗ if and
only if the right hand side of (3) evaluated at If is greater than zero. Substituting for V (If) from
condition (4) yields condition (5) in the proposition. Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 1. If c(θ,e)=α(θ)+β(θ)e,t h e nce(θ,e)e = β(θ)e<α (θ)+β(θ)e = c(θ,e)
for all θ and e,b e c a u s eα(θ) > 0. Hence, it must be ce(θ,ef) <c (θ,ef)/ef, which means that (5)
always holds when w =0 . Q.E.D.




V 0(I∗)cθ(θ,e∗) − V (I∗)cθe(θ,e∗)
V (I∗)cee(θ,e∗) − V 00(I∗)[I∗ + c(θ,e∗)]
.
Due to concavity of V (I), the denominator is always positive. The sign of ∂I∗(θ)/∂θ is thus
determined by the sign of the numerator. Solving for V (I∗) from condition (3) and substituting to
the numerator yields ∂I∗(θ)/∂θ < 0 i fa n do n l yi fcθ(θ,e∗)[1 + ce(θ,e∗)] <c θe(θ,e∗)[I∗ + c(θ,e∗)].
Using c(θ,e)=θ(A + e), this condition simpliﬁes to A<w . Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 .(i) Since the equilibrium interest rate is determined by the zero proﬁt
condition for the marginal ﬁr m ,t h i sp a r ti sp r o v e de x a c t l yt h es a m ew a ya sP r o p o s i t i o n2 .
(ii) The proﬁt-maximizing investment level of a ﬁrm t, I∗(t), is given by the ﬁrst order condition
VI(I∗,φ) − (1 + r∗)[1 + cI(θ,I∗ − w(η))] = 0.( 1 3 )





(1 + r∗)cee(.,e∗) − VII(I∗,φ)
.







Now suppose there exists a ¯ φ such that I∗(¯ φ)=If(¯ φ).T h e n ∂If(¯ φ)/∂φ > ∂I∗(¯ φ)/∂φ,s ot h a t
I∗(φ)−If(φ) decreases in φ at φ = ¯ φ. Hence, I∗(φ) and If(φ) can cross at most once. This implies
that I∗(φ) − If(φ) < 0 for φ>¯ φ and I∗(φ) − If(φ) > 0 for φ<¯ φ.I nt h i sc a s e ,φ∗ = ¯ φ.I ft h e r ei s
no ¯ φ such that I∗(¯ φ)=If(¯ φ), then it must be either I∗(φ) >I f(φ) for all φ,i nw h i c hc a s eφ∗ =1 ,
or I∗(φ) <I f(φ) for all φ,i nw h i c hc a s eφ∗ =0 .
When t = η,t h e n∂I∗(η)/∂η =( 1+r∗)cee(.,e∗)w0(η)/[(1 + r∗)cee(.,e∗) − VII(I∗)] < 0,w h i l e
If(η) is independent of η, i.e., ∂If(η)/∂η =0 . Similarly, when t = θ,t h e n∂I∗(θ)/∂θ = −(1 +
r∗)ceθ(θ,e∗)/[(1 + r∗)cee(θ,e∗) − VII(I∗,φ)] < 0 and ∂If(θ)/∂θ =0 . Therefore, ∂If(t)/∂t −
∂I∗(t)/∂t < 0 in these two cases, so that I∗(t) − If(t) decreases in t, which immediately implies
the claim. Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 2. Follows directly from Proposition 4. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y3 .Part (a) follows directly from Proposition 4. Part (b): A ﬁrm θ overinvests
if and only if its marginal cost of investment, (1 + r∗)[1 + cI(θ,If(η) − w(η))], is lower than the
eﬃcient marginal cost, 1+rf, that is, if and only if
1+rf
1+r∗ > 1+cI(θ,If(η) − w(η)). (14)
26For the ﬁrms with ce(θ,e)=0this reduces to 1+rf
1+r∗ > 1, which always holds because r∗ <r f.
Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y4 .Part (a) follows directly from Proposition 4. In part (b), the logic is the
same as in part (b) of Corollary 3. When w(η) >I f(η),t h e ncI(.,If(t) − w(η)) = 0 for this ﬁrm
and (14) reduces to 1+rf
1+r∗ > 1, which always holds because r∗ <r f. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 .(a) This claim follows directly from the ﬁrst order condition (9) (where
λ =0 )a n df r o mr∗∗ <r ∗
1 = rf.
(b) A ﬁrm with productivity t established in economy 2 overinvests if and only if its marginal
cost of investment at the eﬃcient level, (1+r∗∗)[1 +cI(θ,If(t)−w(η))], is lower than the eﬃcient
marginal cost, 1+rf, that is, if and only if (11) holds.
(c) This part holds because the ﬁrst order conditions for the ﬁrms investments, both in the
presence and in the absence of a deadweight cost C(θ,e), are the same whether the economy is
open or closed, and because r∗∗ <r f. Hence, the proofs of parts (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 4
apply also when the economies are open. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 .When the H ﬁrms ﬁnd it proﬁtable to seek outside capital, their proﬁts
are given by πH = V (I∗
H)−(1+r∗)[c(θ,e∗
H)+I∗
H]. Suppose S0(r∗)=0 , so that the total amount of
investment funds available in this economy (including the ﬁrms’ cash reserves, w)i sﬁxed. Denote
this amount as E. The total welfare in this economy, W(θ), is then given by the sum of the
returns on the available investment funds plus the proﬁts of the H ﬁrms: W(θ)=E(1 + r∗)+













then S(r∗) − hcH − hI∗
H < 0. Since
∂(1+r∗)
∂wL > 0 (as will be shown shortly), the ﬁrst term in the
expression for
∂W(wL)
∂wL is negative. Hence, a suﬃcient condition for
∂W(wL)
∂wL < 0 is that the sum
27of the last two terms is negative as well, which holds if (12) holds. Therefore,
∂W(wL)
∂wL < 0 if (12)
holds and h is suﬃciently close to h2 = h∗∗. To ﬁnish the proof, notice that from the zero proﬁt







> 0, where the inequality follows because
V 0(wL + e∗
L)=( 1+r∗)(cL
e +1 )from the ﬁrst order condition for e∗
L. Q.E.D.
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